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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Sierra Club v. City of Little Rock, 351 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2003)
(reversing award of attorney fees to Sierra Club where it was not a
prevailing party as designated by the Clean Water Act, and affirming
denial of expert witness fees to the City).
Sierra Club brought a citizens' complaint against the City of Little
Rock ("Little Rock") and the Little Rock Sanitary Sewer Committee
("Committee") for violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and their
respective National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems
("NPDES") permits by allowing untreated sewage to flow into Arkansas
rivers and streams. The Committee settled with Sierra Club. Sierra
Club pursued its claims against Little Rock in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas and obtained a partial
summary judgment ruling that Little Rock violated its NPDES permit.
However, the district court did not enter an injunction or grant any
other type of relief to Sierra Club. The district court awarded attorney
fees to Sierra Club, but denied Little Rock expert witness fees. Little
Rock appealed both fee rulings to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eight Circuit. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
award of attorney fees to Sierra Club and affirmed the denial of expert
witness fees to the City.
The CWA permits any prevailing or substantially prevailing party to
collect legal fees if the presiding court deems them appropriate. The
court reviewed de novo whether the Sierra Club was a prevailing party
and, therefore, entitled to legal fees. A party prevails by either
obtaining an enforceable judgment or comparable relief that directly
benefits the party at the time of judgment. Applying this definition,
the court held Sierra Club was not a prevailing party because although
the district court granted partial summary judgment in Sierra Club's
favor, the district court did not grant Sierra Club any relief. Because
Sierra Club was not the prevailing party, the court held they were not
entitled to legal fees, and reversed the district court's award of legal
fees to Sierra Club.
Next, the court reviewed the district court's denial of expert
witness fees for abuse of discretion. The NPDES permit required the
Little Rock to implement a comprehensive master planning process
("plan") to reduce pollution discharge. The court noted that the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, as grantors of the
permit, did not specify what constituted a plan and gave its permittees
considerable flexibility in creating plans. Because of the ambiguity
surrounding the plan's requirements, the court reasoned Sierra Club's
action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Therefore, the court held the district court did not abuse its discretion
and affirmed the denial of the City's motion for fees.
CheryI Miller
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South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
North Dakota and South Dakota were not entitled to preliminary
injunctions barring the United States Army Corps of Engineers'
planned release of water from reservoirs within those states and that
the Corps must abide by its Master Manual guiding Missouri River
water uses and priorities).
The Federal District Court for South Dakota ("South Dakota
District Court") granted the State of South Dakota an injunction
barring the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") from
releasing water from an in-state reservoir along the Missouri River to
maintain downstream river flows. South Dakota's action caused the
Corps to seek the release of water from a reservoir further upstream in
North Dakota. The State of North Dakota responded by obtaining an
injunction from the Federal District Court for North Dakota ("North
Dakota District Court") barring the Corps from releasing water from a
reservoir in their state. In response, the State of Nebraska brought an
action in the Federal District Court for Nebraska ("Nebraska District
Court") and received an injunction requiring the Corps to adhere with
its initial planned action and to release upstream-reservoir waters to
maintain the downstream flows effecting Nebraska.
Although the period on the injunctions had passed, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals heard the Corps' appeal of each district
court's ruling so that the water use issues raised now could be
addressed before similar future actions occurred. The Eighth Circuit
reversed the judgment of the South Dakota and North Dakota District
Courts and affirmed the judgment of the Nebraska District Court.
This matter arose from prolonged drought conditions and the
resulting decreased water levels that occurred in the Missouri River
To meet its obligations in the
Valley in the spring of 2002.
management of the Missouri River under the Flood Control Act of
1944 ("Act"), the Corps chose to release water from a single main stem
reservoir on the river. The Corps determined that releasing water
from Lake Oahe in South Dakota would maintain the downstream
flows necessary for navigation and limit any short-term environmental
impacts to that one reservoir. On the other hand, South Dakota
sought to maintain the existing water levels and restore the walleye
fishery and the related recreational benefits in Lake Oahe. South
Dakota contended maintenance of minimum water levels was
necessary to increase the population of the walleye's main prey, the
rainbow smelt. Even a slight decrease in the reservoir water level
would lead to an unsuccessful spawning season and would negatively
impact South Dakota's efforts to restore the recreational value of the
walleye fishery within the reservoir.
South Dakota sued the Corps, arguing the Corps' actions to
maintain navigational water levels instead of maximizing recreational
benefits were arbitrary and capricious. South Dakota sought an
injunction barring the release of water from the reservoir until after
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the spawning season. The District Court of South Dakota granted a
preliminary injunction preventing the Corps from releasing water
from Lake Oahe and one other reservoir until the end of the spawning
season.
In response, the Corps planned to release water from Lake
Sakakawea in North Dakota to meet its obligations in maintaining the
navigational water levels on the river. North Dakota sued in the
Federal District Court of North Dakota and obtained an injunction
preventing the release of water from its reservoir. The South Dakota
District Court denied Nebraska's earlier request to intervene in the
South Dakota case. As a result, Nebraska brought an action and
received an injunction against the Corps in the Nebraska District
Court requiring the Corps to maintain navigational water levels as
prescribed under the Corps' Master Manual consistent with the Act.
Because of the three district courts' decisions, the Corps was unable to
meet its obligations under the Act.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the three
district courts erred in granting preliminary injunctions. The standard
of review of a district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction
is for an abuse of discretion by finding the district court "erred in the
characterization of the facts, made a mistake of law, or abused its
discretion in considering the equities."
The Corps claimed its actions were not subject to judicial review.
The court disagreed, indicating that the Corps' actions were
reviewable under law from both the Act and the Master Manual. The
court found that while the Corps has considerable discretion under
the Act, that power is not unconstrained and the Corps' actions are
therefore subject to judicial review under the Act. Further, the court
found that the Corps' issuance of and adherence to its Master Manual
created a binding obligation on the Corps. That obligation is also
subject to judicial review to ensure conformity.
Finding the Corps' actions subject to judicial review, the court
looked first at the injunction issued by the South Dakota District
Court. South Dakota argued it was ended to relief on several claims.
It claimed first that the Act required the Corps to act in a manner
maximizing all benefits including recreation.
South Dakota also
claimed the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously by weighing
navigational interests more heavily over recreational interests.
With respect to South Dakota's first claim that the Corps must
balance all interests in its decision making process, the court found the
Corps' decision to prioritize navigation over recreational benefits is
not the type of standard the "courts regularly employ in reviewing
agency actions." The court stated the Act did not provide it the power
to review every decision of the Corps to ensure that all benefits were
maximized for all interests.
The court next addressed South Dakota's claim that lowering the
water level in Lake Oahe was arbitrary and capricious, citing the rule
that "[a] court may find an action to be arbitrary and capricious only
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when there is no rational basis for the policy choice." Here, the court
found the Corps' planned actions to be rational and based on facts
specifically relating to the affected reservoir. The planned draw of
water from the reservoir was consistent with the Master Manual and
would not result in long-term detrimental affects to the reservoir
fishery. The court concluded South Dakota's claim would not succeed
on its merits and therefore it was not entitled to the preliminary
injunction.
North Dakota's arguments to support the preliminary injunction
issued by the North Dakota District Court were similar to South
Dakota's. Like South Dakota's claims, the court found North Dakota's
claims would likely not succeed on the merits. The court therefore
held North Dakota was not entitled to the preliminary injunction.
Lastly, the court reviewed the injunction entered by the Nebraska
District Court. The court agreed with the Nebraska District Court,
finding the Corps bound by the policies adopted and listed in its
Master Manual. Specifically, the plan provided for the maintenance of
navigational water levels as a higher priority than wildlife and
recreational benefits.
Therefore, Nebraska was entitled to the
preliminary injunction as issued by the Nebraska District Court.
Chris Wittenbrink

NINTH CIRCUIT
County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding the Endangered Species Act authorizes the
United States Forest Service to restrict'rights-of-way in water ditches
within its boundaries, notwithstanding contrary state water law).
Okanogan County ("Okanogan") filed a declaratory judgment suit
against the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington after the
United States Forest Service ("USFS") limited Okanogan's use of both
the Skyline Irrigation Ditch ("Skyline Ditch") and the Early Winters
Ditch ("Winters Ditch"), both located in Washington state, to protect
certain species of fish. The district court heard cross-motions for
summary judgment, ruling in favor of the NMFS because the USFS had
authority to restrict the rights-of-way. Okanogan appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The original rights-of-way for the Skyline Ditch and Winters Ditch
dated from the early 1900s. The USFS previously issued several rightsof-way permits to Okanogan, all reserving the USFS's discretion to
revoke the permits. The rights-of-way terms permitted the USFS to
include new terms, and specifically stated that the permits transferred
no water rights to Okanogan. Following a 1998 assessment of special
use permits on the Chewuch River-the water source for both

